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WHEN COURTS AND POLITICS
COLLIDE: MONGOLIA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
TOM GINSRG *
GOMBOSUREN GANZORIG

I.

INTRODUCTION

Mongolia's political system has received well-deserved attention as
one of the most successful examples of democratization in the Asian
region Since 1990, Mongolia has undergone peaceful constitutional change
and has conducted several democratic elections. Human rights are wellrespected, the media is free and political competition exists? This is all the
more remarkable given that constitutional democracy has developed
"without prerequisites,"3 that is, without a previous history of democracy or
social pluralism that is sometimes thought necessary for democracy to
flourish.
During the early years of transition, Mongolia's Constitutional
Court played an important role in facilitating democratic change. The court
occasionally overturned parliamentary legislation while serving as a vehicle
to protect human rights and the constitutional scheme. However, in recent
years Mongolia's Constitutional Court has found itself at the center of a
major controversy regarding the very structure of the political system.
Through a series of decisions that has placed it at odds with the legislature,
the Court has raised questions about its ability to play an appropriate role in
a constitutional democracy. This article traces the origins of the current
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
•* Former Judge, Supreme Court of Mongolia; Adjunct Professor, Texas Wesleyan University
School of Law.
1. See annual reports in ASIAN SURVEY (1991-97).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MONGOLIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2000; Tom Ginsburg and G.
Ganzorig, Constitutionalism and Human Rights in Mongolia, in MONGOLIA INTRANsmo.4 (OLE
BRuuN AND OLE ODGAARD, EDS, 1996.)
3. Steven Fish, Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites,9 J. De-1OC. 127 (1998).
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problems with the Mongolian constitutional scheme and describes the
Court's role in precipitating the political crisis.
II.

BACKGROUND: MONGOLIA'S TRANSFORMATION AND
THE 1992 CONSTITUTION

Mongolia is a landlocked country located between Russia and
China. Beginning in the 12 th century, its tribes united and conquered the
largest empire the world has ever known, but gradually the country came to
be dominated by the Manchu empire that governed China.4 Until 1911,
Mongolia was administered as part of the Chinese empire. With China
convulsed in revolution and chaos for the next decade, Mongolia began to
seek its independence and in 1921, established an independent republic with
the help of the Soviet Union. For the next seven decades, Mongolia was
dominated by Soviet influence although it always maintained its
independent statehood. A single party, the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party (the "MPRP"), controlled politics.
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Mongolian
students began to demand democratic reforms. The ruling MPRP agreed and
a new period of democracy was introduced. 5 One of the most important
tasks was constitutional reform, and a large drafting committee was
established with representation from all political parties. After canvassing
some one hundred foreign constitutions, the new Constitution was
promulgated in early 1992.6 The Constitution featured a new unicameral
parliament called the State Great Hural, a directly elected President, and a
Constitutional Court with the power to strike legislation that was
unconstitutional.
Mongolia's Constitutional Court is a nine-member body with three
members appointed by each of the President, the State Great Hural, and the
Supreme Court. Cases can be brought to the Court by certain designated
governmental officials as well as by any member of the public who sends
a petition alleging a violation of the constitution.7 Petitions are initially
considered by one member of the Court.' If the member believes there is a
constitutional violation, a three-member panel of the Court hears the case.
4. See generally ROBERT WORDEN AND ANDREA MARLES, MONGOLIA: A COUNTRY STUDY
(1991).
5. See Tom Ginsburg, Between Russia and China: PoliticalReform in Mongolia, 35 ASIAN
SURVEY 459 (1995).
6. Alan J.K. Sanders, Mongolia'sNew Constitution,32 ASIAN SURVEY 42 (1992).
7. CONST. OF MONGOLIA, Art. 69.
8. Law on Constitutional Court, Art. 9(1)
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A decision on unconstitutionality is automatically forwarded to the State
Great Hural that has the right to accept or reject the Court's decision. If the
State Great Hural accepts the decision of the Court, the act in question is
deemed unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the State Great Hural rejects
the finding of unconstitutionality, the case is sent back to the Constitutional
Court for consideration by the full court en banc. The full court's decision
is final. 9 This procedure of legislative approval of declarations of
unconstitutionality, which has some parallels with the procedure of the
Constitutional Tribunal in Poland until 1997, reflects residual socialist
notions of parliamentary sovereignty, namely that parliament has a
legitimate role in constitutional interpretation. The debates over institutional
design in Mongolia, however, ultimately culminated in a system where the
Court has the final say on constitutionality.
In the elections immediately following the new Constitution, the
MPRP won an overwhelming victory and for the next four years controlled
the government and State Great Hural. Parliamentary legislation was
occasionally challenged before the Constitutional Court in minor cases, and
the Court was willing to strike legislation. Furthermore, the State Great
Hural became embroiled in a number of disputes with the first President, P.
Ochirbat. The Constitutional Court had to resolve some of these disputes as
well, and by and large mediated them in a manner that led to increased
legitimacy of the Court. Mongolia's democratic system seemed to be
deepening despite the political dominance of the former communist party."0
III.

THE 1996 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the National Democrat-Social
Democrat coalition came to power for the first time." Before a government
could be formed, however, a member of the coalition petitioned the Court
to prevent the coalition from filling the cabinet with members of the State
Great Hural, relying on a provision in the Constitution that "members of
parliament shall have no other employment."' 2 The issue turned on the type
9. Law on Constitutional Court Procedure, Art. 3(3).
10. See Tom Ginsburg, Betreen Fireandice:Mongolia in 1996,37 ASIAN SURVEY 60 (1997);
DeepeningDemocracy: Mongolia in 1997,38 ASIAN SURVEY 64 (1998).
11. IM.
12. CONST. OF MONGOLIA, Art. 29. The question of this member's motivation in bringing the
suit is puzzling. D. Lamjav was a senior member of the Social Democratic Party, and had been a
professor of K Gonchigdorj, the Speaker of Parliament. At one time he was considered a potential
presidential candidate for the Party, and w*as considered to be a person of great intellect, with the
highest levels of integrity and devotion to the Constitution. Some observers suggested that he filed
the petition when it became clear that he would not be offered a cabinet post, hoping that by
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of political system established by the 1992 Constitution. Was it a
presidential system where the cabinet is unrelated to the parliament? Or a
parliamentary system, wherein the government is formed by the leading
parties in parliament?
The Court initially found that parliamentary deputies could not hold
cabinet posts. This provoked the rancor of the democratic coalition and
forced it to scrap its anticipated government lineup, requiring a scramble to
find qualified persons to fill the cabinet. The coalition's leadership accused
the Court of acting in a politically motivated fashion, and called for more
"scientific" methods of constitutional interpretations, such as a detailed
inquiry into the travaux prepartoires of the constitutional drafting
committee. 3
The State Great Hural was controlled, for the first time, by the new
parties, and they were given an opportunity to accept or reject the Court's
judgment. They predictably rejected it, leading to a reconsideration of the
case by the full panel of the Court. A second round of arguments was held.
National Democratic Party lawyer and Member of Parliament (MP) B.
Delgerma argued that the parliamentary model had been adopted as a
reaction to the socialist "presidential" system and the over-concentration of
power in the hands of a single individual. It would be anti-democratic to
allow persons who had run and lost in elections for district-based
constituencies to become Ministers. She further argued that, regardless of
the intentions of the drafters, Mongolian democratic practice had already
established the parliamentary character of the political system, since the
MPRP had formed the government with members of parliament during the
first post-constitutional election in 1992. Furthermore, as a practical matter,
all the party leaders had been electoral candidates. Unlike the U.S. system,
where there is a separation between party leadership and electoral
candidates, Mongolian democratic practice after 1990 had required that
narrowing the competition to non-MPs he might be more likely to secure a post. Such a motivation
would have failed to anticipate the tremendous anger directed at Lamjav by his own party after the
Court decision, which was seen to undermine the coalition's historic transition to power. Others
suggested that Lamjav's motives were to benefit the coalition by forcing it to distribute power more
broadly. A third possibility is that Lamjav saw himself as a strict constructionist, and simply believed
that the Constitution required the separation of parliament and government. This is Lamjav's own
claim about his motivation. In this view, he brought the case in an effort to enhance the separation of
powers concept in the Mongolian constitutional structure, and to uphold the internal consistency of
constitutional provisions. One question left outstanding by this account, however, is why he waited
to file his petition until immediately after the election, when he had been aware that the previous
MPRP government was also violating the provision by having MPs in cabinet positions. Lamjav did
divulge in an interview with one of the authors that he had noticed the constitutional issue a year
before bringing the claim.
13. Interview with senior member of the coalition, Ulaanbaatar, December 5, 1997.
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party leaders stand as candidates.
The Court was unconvinced by this position. After a second round
of deliberations, the Court issued a decision upholding its earlier judgment
to the effect that MPs could not join the cabinet without resigning their
seats. 14 The decision has had profound affects on subsequent politics. The
decision was made after the nomination and approval of Prime Minister M.
Enkhsaikhan, who had been Chairman of the coalition and leader of the
successful election campaign. Enkhsaikhan had not run in the parliamentary
election. In the immediate aftermath of the Court's decision, the coalition
had to decide whether other leaders who had won parliamentary seats would
resign them to take ministerial posts. The coalition had fifty out of seventysix parliamentary seats, while the MPRP held twenty-five. One seat was
held by the United Traditional Party, whose representative aligned himself
with the MPRP in the immediate post-election period. This configuration
put the coalition in a difficult position: should fourteen MPs resign to take
ministerial positions, the coalition majority would become thirty-six to
twenty-five with the fourteen seats of parliament to be filled by elections."5
There was a real risk that the coalition would lose its historic majority. 6 In
any case, even a single-seat loss to the MPRP would further jeopardize the
ability of the coalition to obtain a quorum of tvo-thirds of the parliamentary
membership: as it was, they were one seat short, and the swing voter from
the United Traditional Party had helped the MPRP deny a quorum by
joining a walkout during hearings to appoint the Vice-Speaker of the Hural.
In light of these considerations, the coalition decided to comply with the
decision and to form the government exclusively with non-MPs.
The insulation of the government from parliament certainly
weakened democratic accountability. Neither the chief executive nor any
member of his cabinet had won an election. This strange result seems antidemocratic. The usual principal-agent problems that exist between
parliament and government in a parliamentary system were exacerbated by
the lack of mechanisms for the parliament to discipline the government, and
by the social and institutional distance created when cabinet members are
not legislators. There was no opportunity for day-to-day policy debate, with
the Prime Minister defending his policies before the public. Rather,
government members had to be summoned to the parliament, and appear
there as outsiders on an infrequent and extraordinary basis.
14. Judgment of the Constitutional Court (on file with authors).
15. Parliament had not yet clarified what would happen ifa member vacated a seat.
16. The coalition subsequently reorganized the government to reduce the number ofministries
to nine. If only nine MPs resigned, even if the MPRP won all the seats contested in by-elections, the
coalition majority would be assured.
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In the aftermath of the decision, the democratic coalition found
itself in the odd position of having its most powerful leaders ineligible for
ministerial posts. With the coalition forced to give ministerial positions to
second-line leaders, many top leaders were left as mere MPs. Without
distributing ministerships, de facto power within the coalition could not
match formal structure. Factional problems ensued, and the democratic
coalition's term in government came to be widely viewed as a failed
opportunity.
In summary, there were several tensions in the political system that
were either directly caused or exacerbated by the decision to separate the
parliament and government. These include the structural tension between
parliament and government, latent political tensions within the coalition
leadership itself, as top leaders were left without formal positions to match
their power, and tensions within each party as leaders lost the ability to
discipline backbenchers, leading to a rise in district-based political
entrepreneurship on the part of MPs.
In early 1998, the State Great Hural passed a bill to allow Members
of Parliament to serve in the Cabinet. The coalition then decided to replace
the Enkhsaikhan government with a new one formed out of the parliament,
led by former journalist Ts. Elbegdorj. The government, however, was
weak, and fell within three months, initiating an eight month period of
caretaker government, resolved only in December 1998 with the
appointment of J. Narantsaltsralt as the new Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the
new legislation was challenged, and the Constitutional Court duly followed
its original decision in holding the act unconstitutional under article 29,
section 1 of the Constitution.17 Although this judgment was rejected by the
State Great Hural, the full bench of the Court subsequently upheld the
original decision. Again, the result was political chaos, with the MPRP
demanding the resignation from parliament of cabinet members, and the
democratic coalition speculating about early elections.' 8
IV.

MONGOLIA'S FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

With ordinary legislative channels precluded as a means of repairing
the political system, parliamentarians turned to a constitutional amendment.
Mongolia's first-ever constitutional amendment was passed by the State
Great Hural in December 1999 with the support of all major political parties.
17. ConstitutionalCourtRuling, BBC, December 2, 1998, availablein NEXIS, NEWS Library,
ALLNWS file.
18. Id.
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The amendments sought to resolve the issue by providing that ministers
could serve concurrently as MPs.
The complete text of the Constitutional amendment is reproduced
here:
1. In case of a failure to appoint a new Prime Minister within 45 days,
the Parliament should dissolve itself or the President shall dissolve it.
2. The Speaker and Deputy-Speaker of Parliament shall be nominated
from among Parliament members and the voting shall be open. Inthe
vote for the Deputy-Speaker each party group or coalition shall vote
as a group.
3. The duration of the Parliament Session shall be not longer than 50
working days.
4. The quorum of the regular meeting of Parliament is a majority of
members.
5. A Member of Parliament can serve as the Prime Minister or as a
member of the Government.
6. Nomination of a candidate for the Prime Minister's position must be
raised by the President for the Parliament's consideration within five
days of the election.

7. The Prime Minister should reach an accord with the President, on the
Government's composition, within a week, and in case of failure to
reach consensus, the Prime9 Minister can raise the issue for
parliamentary consideration.'
The amendment was sent to the President for signature. The
President, however, promptly vetoed the amendment on December 24, 1999,
even though it had the support of his own MPRP party members2 0 Among
the grounds given by the President for his veto was the lack of consultation
with the Constitutional Court, which is alleged to have a role in
constitutional amendments. This argument was based on article 68 section
1 of the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that the Constitutional
Court can propose constitutional amendments. The President also suggested
the State Great Hural should have consulted with the 17 political parties not
represented in it, along with the President, the National Security Council and
the Government, before passing the amendment.
This tortured interpretation of the Constitution relied on a reading
of the power to propose an amendment as including a right to consultation
19. Teriin medeelel # 59 (Government reporter), Ulaanbaatar, December 24, 1999 (translation
by authors).
20. The veto was inaccordance wvith the article 33 section 1.1 of the Const. of Mongolia,, wiich
states that the President has the right to veto, partially, or wholly, laws and other decisions adopted
by the State Great Hural.
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or any proposed amendments. Explaining his veto in his speech on
Constitution Day, President Bagabandi said:
Just like any other law, the Constitution cannot remain without
amendments. However, an amendment must be made in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution and its tradition. The only
criteria for the rule of law is whether we treat the Constitution in
accordance with the principle provided by the Constitution. A law,
particularly the Constitution, should not be applied ina discretionary
fashion, nor should there be an attempt for a willful interpretation.
This principle must have an important place in the government
policy. Any amendment to the Constitution must express all the
Mongolian peoples' wish and their opinion; therefore it must start
from the people. I swore to the Constitution and to people, as the
President of Mongolia, and I have the right and responsibility to save
the original Constitution;2therefore I express my real commitment for
following this principle. '
It was also alleged that by allowing parliament members to serve in
government, the amendment violated the separation of powers principle
provided in the Constitution. The President criticized other parts of the
amendment as well. He alleged that by reducing the quorum required to hold
a parliamentary session the amendment disturbed the legislative process.
Other alleged defects were the provision that the president could dissolve
the parliament should it fail to nominate a prime minister within a certain
period and the specification that party membership is a requirement for
deputy speaker.
The President's veto, however, was overridden by an overwhelming
majority at the State Great Hural on January 6, 2000. Only one member, J.
Gombojav, voted to uphold the veto, saying that the draft of the First
Amendment was presented to members of the State Great Hural on the
morning of the day of discussion, not a week before its debate as required
by the Parliamentary Rules. On this narrow procedural ground, he supported
the President, but the rest of the Hural members voted to maintain the
amendment as originally passed.
The rejection of the veto prompted an appeal by S. Narangerel, head
of the Mongolia National University Law School, to the Constitutional
22
Court on the validity of the amendments on procedural grounds.
Narangerel argued that Article 69, section 1 provides that an amendment to
21. Translation by authors.
22. See ODRIIN SONIN newspaper (Ulaanbaatar), January 4, 2000.
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the Constitution must be adopted by a vote of not less than three-fourths of
all members of the Parliament. 23 According to the Constitution there must
be 76 members of Parliament, but at the time of the session former member
R. Amarjargal had been appointed Prime Minister, member 0. Dashbalbar
had passed away, and three members had been convicted and sentenced on
corruption charges. Therefore, according to this argument, the Constitution
could not be amended until all seats were filled. On March 15, the initial
bench of the Court ruled that the amendments were themselves incompatible
with the Constitution, particularly the separation of powers principle. Again,
the Court had put the issue back into the hands of the State Great Hural.
According to the procedural law of the Constitutional Court, it was
up to the Hural to accept or reject the Court decision within 15 days after it
received the opinion. The Hural, however, chose to take no action at all.
Without a rejection by the Hural, the Court could not hear the ease again
and issue a final decision en banc. This state of limbo was precisely what
the Hural desired. On April 5, 2000 a group of lawyers sent a letter to the
State Great Hural urging the members to accept the ruling of the
Constitutional Court on the First Amendment, and demanding that they
follow the law and public opinion. Professionals, politicians, and citizens
were awaiting action by the Hural regarding the First Amendment. Despite
the public criticism and three formal requests by the Constitutional Court,
the Hural delayed its consideration.
Many different factors caused this late response. The democratic
coalition that dominated the State Great Hural was rather busy with the
upcoming elections and preferred to pass the problem to its successors.
Furthermore, with elections upcoming, the political situation did not favor
a debate over the First Amendment. Members of the State Great Hural
simply did not want to take responsibility for any potential wrongdoing, or
risk taking steps that might hurt their reputations right before the new
election. Had the State Great Hural rejected the Court decision, the
Constitutional Court would likely have overturned the First Amendment in
a final decision en banc.
Elections in July led to an overwhelming victory by the MPRP,
which took 72 out of 76 seats. In the first Session of the State Great Hural
meeting, the MPRP majority agreed to ignore the Constitutional Court
ruling and allow the formation of a government that included members of
the Hural, as if the controversial amendments to the Constitution had
survived. The Court had stood firm in its insistence on a separation of
parliament and government, and as a consequence had provoked the
23. Id.
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politicians to ignore it. Many criticized the State Great Hural for engaging
in its own constitutional interpretation, saying in effect that this violated the
separation of powers principle because that function was reserved to the
Constitutional Court.
On July 28, 2000, four months and 12 days after the Court's
decision and nearly four months after the expiration of the period required
by law for consideration of such a decision, the State Great Hural finally
debated the Constitutional Court ruling, but avoided a formal rejection. By
a vote of 62 to 2, it stated that the Constitutional Court had heard an issue
outside its jurisdiction-namely the constitutionality of a constitutional
amendment. State Great Hural member Sanjaasurengiin Oyun, leader of the
Civil Courage Party, opposed the State Great Hural's action, stating: "The
Parliament is acting illegally. The problem is that they are trying to bend the
constitution according to their problems. This is dangerous-they could
raise their hands for fascism and then say it was constitutional. 24 Other
party leaders also expressed their concern about the State Great Hural's
action. Mr. B. Jargalsaihan, Chairman of the Mongolian Republican Party,
said that the chairman of the ruling party could be appointed as the Prime
Minister, but not in a fashion that violated the law. Mr. U. Hurelbaatar, the
Chairman of the Mongolian United Traditional Party, stated that the
Constitution or decisions of the Constitutional Court could be violated
further, if this practice became a regular occurrence.
The public reaction did not focus on the delay of over four months
by the State Great Hural in reacting to the Court decision, but rather on the
manner in which the Hural expressed its views. Instead of issuing a formal
resolution reacting to the Court decision as required by the Law on the
Parliament, the legislature decided to include a short note in its record
indicating that it considered the issue finalized. The Constitutional Court
expressed its dissatisfaction with the protocol, and on August 1, 2000 it sent
a letter demanding an official resolution. The Court also asserted that the
State Great Hural had authorized itself to interpret the Constitution, which
should be the exclusive job of the Constitutional Court.
The same day, Speaker of the Hural L. Enebish replied to the
Constitutional Court Chairman, stating that the Parliament had concluded
that any resolution accepting or rejecting the Court's decision would be
considered an acceptance of the illegal action of the Constitutional Court.25
24. Ira Halasz, Parliament'sConclusion on the Constitutional Court Ruling, MONGOLIAN
NEWS (Ulaanbaatar), July 29, 2000.
25. See ParliamentSpeaker Sent Reply Note to Constitutional Court Chairman, OANA-

MONTSAME, August 3, 2000. Montsame, the Mongolian National News Agency, is available at
<http://www.mol.mn/montsame/>.
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Other key members also expressed their view in favor of the State Great
Hural decision. According to Mr. Ts. Sharavdorj, an influential lawyer and
Member of the Hural, the Constitutional Court itself violated the
Constitution by considering the First Amendment. The amendment was not
an ordinary law, but rather became an organic part of the Constitution once
the State Great Hural adopted the amendment by supermajority. The Court
was not authorized to discuss whether the amendment was unconstitutional
or not, much less overturn it. Sharavdor suggested merging the
Constitutional Court with the Supreme Court, asking rhetorically whether
Mongolia needed two high Courts.26 Moreover, he mentioned the possibility
of recalling those members of the Constitutional Court that had been
appointed by the State Great Hural, despite the fact that there is no such
formal mechanism of recall. These remarks could be seen as a tacit threat
to the Court.
Sharavdorj's argument is that there is no jurisdiction for the
Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of a constitutional
amendment because of the supermajority required to pass an amendment.
Once a supermajority acts, he seems to say, the Amendment becomes part
of the Constitution, and the only job of the Court is to interpret it and apply
it to any disputes that so require. This does not seem to be fully convincing:
would it also prevent the Constitutional Court from examining the
procedural question of whether the Amendment was adopted according to
the formal procedures required by the Constitution? The answer is unclear
from Sharavdorj's statement. Furthermore there is no jurisdictional
limitation in the Constitution allowing the Court to consider only matters
adopted by parliamentary majority. The Constitution is also silent on the
question of whether amendments need be introduced only after consultation
with other bodies and the Constitutional Court as the President's veto
suggested.
In any case, to determine whether such provisions exist in the
Constitution itself requires interpretation of the document. In this regard, the
Court certainly has a role and arguably should have the final determination.
The Court ought to have what the German Constitutional Court has called
the Kompetenz Kompetenz, the power to determine what the Constitution
dictates its jurisdiction to include.27
The Hural's response to the Court decision, neither accepting nor
rejecting it, itself raises a constitutional question on the status of the Court
26. See ZUUNY MEDEE nevspaper, March 28,2000.
27. See generally DONALD KOMMERS, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPuBLic OF GERMANY (2d. ed. 1996).
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decision. Most observers agree that the Court must review the State Great
Hural response, whatever its form. In this regard, Mr. Namhai Haidav, who
filed the initial petition to the Court, re-petitioned again, complaining that
the Court unduly delayed hearing his petition. 21 In a newspaper interview,
Constitutional Court Chairman N. Jantsan said that the State Great Hural
violated the Constitution by refusing to render a formal resolution, since the
Hural had intended to prevent the Constitutional Court from hearing the
issue. 29 There should not be any confusion about whether the issue was
under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, said Jantsan, and only the
Court is capable of determining the extent of Constitutional Court
jurisdiction. Therefore the Court must review the matter and issue a final
decision. Otherwise, the Hural would never render any formal resolution if
it disagreed with a Constitutional Court ruling, allowing Parliament to avoid
the supervision of the Constitutional Court.
On the question of why it delayed its own re-consideration of the
question by the Full Bench, Chairman Jantsan responded that the Court was
waiting to see whether the State Great Hural would render a decision
according to the law. He also noted that the Court did not want to destabilize
the political situation in the country. However, he concluded that delay was
no longer justified. On October 29, 2000, the Court reconsidered the
Constitutional Amendment and again ruled that it was unconstitutional. It
relied on procedural grounds, specifically Article 68.1, which states that
amendments to the Constitution may be initiated by certain designated
bodies. The Court read these as being exclusive, implying that a
Constitutional Amendment initiated by State Great Hural on its own was not
constitutional because the legislature failed to consult with the
Constitutional Court and the President. Seven members of the Court were
present and voted.
The MPRP Government was now in a dilemma. The Prime Minister
and four members of the cabinet were themselves members of the State
Great Hural. Giving up the parliamentary seats would force a by-election,
but that was not completely out of the question given the huge MPRP
majority. Nevertheless, the MPRP responded by initiating another
Constitutional amendment with exactly the same text as had already been
adopted-and rejected-the previous year. The proposed amendment was
presented simultaneously to the State Great Hural, the President and
Constitutional Court, seeking to avoid the charge that the initiators had not
followed proper procedures. In a sense, they were challenging the
28. ODRIIN SONIN newspaper (Ulaanbaatar), October 16,2000.
29. See Interview, DAILY MIRROR, November 16, 2000.
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Constitutional Court to review the amendment on substantive grounds since
the Court had, in its final rejection, relied on procedural grounds rather than
the provision in the Constitution that says that members can have no other
employment outside Parliament.
The amendment passed by a vote of 68-0 with four members
protesting the session by not attending. Again, however, the President
vetoed the amendment, forcing the State Great Hural to reconsider the
amendment. There is little doubt that the Hural will be able to muster the
necessary two-thirds votes since the amendment itself had required a threequarters vote. There also seems little doubt that the issue will again come
before the Constitutional Court, since the original question has still not been
answered as to whether Article 29(1), which states that members of
Parliament can have no other employment except as provided by law, allows
members to also serve in the government.
V.

ANALYSIS

The story of the Mongolian Constitutional Court and its game of
political hot potato with the President and Parliament illustrates the dangers
for courts in new democracies when they cannot avoid overtly political
issues. Although the Court had several opportunities to defuse the situation
by giving in to parliamentary wishes, it never took the opportunity to do so
and in this manner has extended the constitutional crisis for over four years.
The crisis concerns the fundamental nature of the political system and is not
likely to be easily resolved.
Our view is that the Court was correct in determining its ability to
hear the validity of constitutional amendments, at least on procedural
grounds. Otherwise, Parliament would be able to pass unconstitutional
amendments without any review whatsoever. On the other hand there are no
substantive limitations in the Mongolian Constitution on the ability of
Parliament to pass constitutional amendments. Furthermore, the particular
grounds of the final Court decision rejecting the amendments seem difficult
to defend. Article 68(1) states that "Amendments to the Constitution may be
initiated by organization and officials enjoying the right to legislative
initiative and may be proposed by the Constitutional Court to the National
Parliament." But this does not mean that the Hural itself cannot pass
constitutional amendments on its own initiative or that there is any
requirement of consultation before passing an amendment. Indeed, it is clear
that Parliament itself enjoys the legislative initiative so can "initiate"
amendments under Article 68(1). The contrary reading seems to give the
Constitutional Court the exclusive right of "proposing" amendments to the
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parliament, which is an odd function to give to the Court whose primary role
is interpreting the constitutional text. A more democratic theory of
constitutional amendment would seek to locate the power of initiation in the
Parliament itself.
If the Parliament should have the right to initiate amendments, even
without consultation, it also seems clear that the Court should have the
power to consider the constitutionality of amendments. Comparative
experience shows that sometimes constitutional courts have considered the
validity of amendments, beyond merely ensuring that the amendment
process followed constitutionally-required procedures. The South African
Constitutional Court, for example, struck provisions of the draft Constitution
itself during that country's transition to democracy.30 In another well-known
case, the Indian Supreme Court struck down parts of a constitutional
amendment that precluded judicial review of property rights claims. 3' The
Parliament had passed the amendment in part because it was unhappy with
the Court's property rights jurisprudence, as the Court had continually
required the government to pay full compensation for property that it
nationalized. The Court held that constitutional amendments inconsistent
with the Constitution's "basic structure" could be rejected by the Court.
Because the right to appeal to the Court for violations of fundamental rights
was explicitly granted in the Constitution, an amendment voiding it was not
acceptable.
It is important to note that in the aftermath of the decision, Indira
Gandhi's government attacked the Court as an institution, announcing
publicly that it intended to limit Court appointments to those sympathetic
to government concerns and bypassing the usual seniority norm concerning
appointments to the Chief Justiceship. 32 When Gandhi declared emergency
rule in 1975, the legislature passed a constitutional amendment preventing
the Court from scrutinizing future constitutional amendments for conformity
with the Constitution. In the face of these attacks on jurisdiction and threats
to judicial independence, the Court largely submitted to politicians' desires.
Nevertheless, it has insisted on and retained the power to review
amendments.
The Indian case can be distinguished from the present case in part
because the former involved an issue of basic human rights. Although the
discussion in the Indian Constitutional Court focused on "basic structure,"
30.
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the case involved a government seeking to overturn the fundamental bargain
on property rights that had been made at the founding of the country. The
Mongolian case involves a real issue of "basic structure," namely the
character of the political system. The constitutional amendment was passed
because of a dysfunction in the design of basic political institutions.
Arguably, the Court should defer to the political process in such areas
because it is politicians, not the Court, who are in the best position to
evaluate the efficacy of political structure.3 3 From this perspective,
Mongolian constitutional democracy would have been better served had the
Court recognized that the political process was responding to a need for a
more effective system of governance. The fact that the amendment was
supported by all major political forces is some evidence of this need.
It is also important to note that the constitutional amendment was
passed to overturn a decision of the Court itself. United States experience
shows that constitutional amendments are frequently proposed to overturn
Supreme Court decisions. In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, which upheld
the right of a woman to have an abortion, numerous constitutional
amendments have been proposed to ban abortion entirely. At least seven
constitutional amendments were passed in order to reverse a Supreme Court
decision. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) barring slavery
and the Fifteenth Amendment (1868) protecting the citizenship of African
Americans effectively overturned DredScott v. Sandford.35 The Sixteenth
Amendment (1913) gave Congress the power to impose an income tax,
thereby overturning Pollock v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Co. 36 The TwentySixth Amendment (1971) overturned Oregon v. Mitchell which, among
other things, held that Congress could not regulate the voting age in state
elections. The amendment set the voting age at 18 years.
In none of these cases was the Court given an opportunity to strike
the amendment as unconstitutional, and it is unlikely the Court would be
viewed as having the power to do so. In part this is because the amendment
process in the United States requires a long period of time. Article V of the
United States Constitution provides that a constitutional amendment may be
proposed by a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives and the
Senate or by a national convention called by Congress at the request of twothirds of the state legislatures. In practice, all of the amendments have been
proposed by either the House or Senate. After proposal, the amendment
33.
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must be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures (38 states) or
special conventions called in three-fourths of the states. The Twenty-First
Amendment was the only one to be ratified in the latter manner. Congress
decides which method of ratification will be used and the time limit within
which it must take place. Thus the procedures are complex and it is
noteworthy that only twenty-seven amendments have been passed since the
Constitution was ratified in 1789, ten of them having been passed
simultaneously in the form of the 1791 Bill of Rights.
Other countries have simpler procedures for passing constitutional
amendments.38 Usually, when a legislature is involved, it must pass the
amendment by a supermajority, as in the Mongolian case. In other countries,
such as Israel, a simple majority can pass an amendment, blurring the
distinction between amendments and ordinary legislation. In some instances,
the legislature must pass the amendment and then send it before the people
for approval in a referendum. This is the case in such countries as Australia,
Japan and Switzerland. It is generally true that the more government
institutions that must be involved and the more complex the procedure, the
39
more difficult it is to pass amendments.
It is also important to recognize that there is more to the
Constitution than meets the eye. Many changes in the American
governmental structure have occurred without formal constitutional
amendment. 40 For example, the United States Constitution is silent on the
issue of political parties, but they are fundamental to the working of modern
government and arguably have some "constitutional" status in the political
system. The entire administrative state is not contemplated in the text of the
Constitution itself.4' The practice of government can become constitutional
in importance. Arguably, the Mongolian Constitutional Court could have
taken this view of political structure and found that it need not rule on the
main issue presented before it, as to do so would unnecessarily disrupt the
political system.
In terms of the underlying issue as to whether members of the State
Great Hural can serve in the government, it is arguable that the Constitution
does not require that government and Parliament be separated as the Court
38. See generally Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237-74 (S.
Levinson, ed., 1995).
39. Id.
40. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times has the Constitution been Amended? in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 15
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suggests. Many other political systems allow members of parliament to
serve in the government. The drafters of the Mongolian Constitution failed
to make clear that their intent was a complete separation of cabinet and
Parliament. The June 1991 draft of the Constitution contained a provision,
Article 32, stating that "Members of the State Great Hural cannot
concurrently occupy the posts of... members of the government." 42 But this
text was explicitly rejected in the final version in favor of the Article 29 text
stating that members may not hold posts "other than those assigned by law."
The founders thus considered and rejected a complete separation between
the two powers. Attributing rationality to the drafters and engaging in the
always-risky business of determining legislative intent, it appears that
Mongolia's constitutional founders intended to allow MPs to join the
government, but subject to ordinary legislation defining the terms under
which they may do so. In the absence of such legislation, the Court was
faced with an interpretive problem, namely whether to read the original text
literally, or to rely on more purposive strategies of constitutional
interpretation. The Court took the former route, but the latter may have been
more appropriate.43 This is particularly true given that the Court had earlier
rejected legislation proposing to facilitate MPs serving in government.
Undoubtedly, the Court could have avoided the entire crisis by simply
allowing that legislation to stand.
If the amendment itself seems to have been constitutional, the State
Great Hural's failure to respond to the Court decision finding otherwise was
not contemplated by the drafters and appears to have hurt the constitutional
order. At a minimum, the Hural violated its own organic law by failing to
consider the issue within fifteen days and then issuing a ruling either
accepting or rejecting the Constitutional Court decision. The legal
requirement is that the State Great Hural must render the resolution only on
whether it agrees or disagrees with the ruling of Constitutional Court, but
the law did not authorize the Hural to consider whether the Court ruling is
itself legal or illegal. The approach of the Hural was to take for itself the
power to interpret whether the Court's behavior was constitutional, a
problematic approach with great potential for deadlock and dueling
interpretations. Our view is that the Hural and the Constitutional Court must
both act with greater restraint and demonstrate their commitment to the rule
of law by abiding by the requirements of the Constitution, while also
respecting each other's institutional compliance.
42. Draft on file with authors.
43. See PHiLip BOBBrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FARE: THEORY OF THE CONSTrruTION. (1982) for a
discussion of different modes of constitutional interpretation.
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In short, neither Parliament nor the Court has come out of the crisis
unscathed and both have engaged in short-sighted behavior. Ever-hungry for
ministerships, the members of Parliament have ignored the long-term
stability and health of the political system. In the face of such behavior, the
Court has tried to stand firm but may have hurt its own legitimacy through
its own bizarre readings of the constitutional text.
Mongolia's transition to democracy since 1990 has been stronger
and more successful than any other central Asian state. But it remains the
case that the internal constitutional order has been damaged by the
continuous state of uncertainty regarding the basic norms of the political
system since the first suit brought in 1996 on the issue of separating the
Parliament and government. The Constitutional Court has several times
passed up opportunities to resolve this issue in a way that allows for a
functioning political system; instead it has consistently adopted an overly
strict reading of the constitutional text without sensitivity to political
dynamics. The political forces, on the other hand, have disregarded the
Constitutional Court's pronouncements and have endangered the
constitutional order themselves. Mongolia's political and legal community
must seek a reasonable resolution to the issue as soon as possible. Otherwise
this fragile experiment of growing democracy in foreign soil may fail.
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